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The Stock Market and Investment: 
Is the Market a Sideshow? 
RECENT EVENTS and research findings increasingly suggest that the stock 
market is not driven solely by news about fundamentals. There seem to 
be good theoretical as well as empirical reasons to believe that investor 
sentiment, also referred to as fads and fashions, affects stock prices. By 
investor sentiment we mean beliefs held by some investors that cannot 
be rationally justified. Such investors are sometimes referred to as noise 
traders. To affect prices, these less-than-rational beliefs have to be 
correlated across noise traders, otherwise trades based on mistaken 
judgments would cancel out. When investor sentiment affects the 
demand of enough investors, security prices diverge from fundamental 
values. 
The debates over market efficiency, exciting as they are, would not 
be important if the stock market did not affect real economic activity. If 
the stock market were a sideshow, market inefficiencies would merely 
redistribute wealth between smart investors and noise traders. But if the 
stock market influences real economic activity, then the investor senti- 
ment that affects stock prices could also indirectly affect real activity. 
We would like to thank Gene Fama, Jim Poterba, David Romer, Matt Shapiro, Chris 
Sims, and Larry Summers for helpful comments. The National Science Foundation, 
The Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, 
and Dimensional Fund Advisors provided financial support. 
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It is well known that stock returns by themselves achieve respectable 
R2 's in forecasting investment changes in aggregate data.' If stock 
returns are infected by sentiment, and if stock returns predict investment, 
then perhaps sentiment influences investment. There is also evidence, 
however, that investment has not always responded to sharp movements 
in stock prices. For example, real investment did not seem to rise sharply 
during the stock market boom in the late 1920s. Nor was there an 
investment collapse after the crash of 1987.2 It remains an open question, 
then, whether inefficient markets have real consequences. 
In this paper, we try to address empirically the broader question of 
how the stock market affects investment. We identify four theories that 
explain the correlation between stock returns and subsequent invest- 
ment. The first says that the stock market is a passive predictor of future 
activity that managers do not rely on to make investment decisions. The 
second theory says that, in making investment decisions, managers rely 
on the stock market as a source of information, which may or may not 
be correct about future fundamentals. The third theory, which is perhaps 
the most common view of the stock market's influence, says that the 
stock market affects investment through its influence on the cost of funds 
and external financing. Finally, the fourth theory says that the stock 
market exerts pressure on investment quite aside from its informational 
and financing role, because managers have to cater to investors' opinions 
in order to protect their livelihood. For example, a low stock price may 
increase the probability of a takeover or a forced removal of top 
management. If the market is pessimistic about the firm's profitability, 
top management may be deterred from investing heavily by the prospect 
of further erosion in the stock price. 
The first theory leaves no room for investor sentiment to influence 
investment, but the other three theories allow sentiment to influence 
investment through false signals, financing costs, or market pressure on 
managers. Our empirical analysis looks for evidence on whether senti- 
ment affects investment through these three channels by investigating 
whether the component of stock prices that is orthogonal to future 
economic fundamentals influences investment. 
1. See Bosworth (1975), Fama (1981), Fischer and Merton (1984), Barro (1990), 
Sensenbrenner (1990), and Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1990). 
2. Barro (1990); Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1990). 
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Our tests measure how well the stock market explains investment 
when we control for the fundamental variables both that determine 
investment and that the stock market might be forecasting. These 
fundamental variables serve as a proxy for the profitability of investment 
projects as well as for the availability of internal funds for investment.3 
Essentially, we ask, "Suppose a manager knows the future fundamental 
conditions that affect his investment choice. Would the manager still 
pay attention to the stock market?" If the answer is yes, then there is an 
independent role for the stock market, and possibly for investor senti- 
ment, in influencing investment. The incremental ability of stock returns 
to explain investment, when future fundamentals are held constant, puts 
an upper bound on the role of investor sentiment that is orthogonal to 
fundamentals in explaining investment. 
For example, suppose that stock prices forecast investment only to 
the extent that they forecast fundamental factors influencing investment. 
In this case, that part of stock prices-including possible investor 
sentiment-that does not help predict fundamentals also does not help 
predict investment. Thus, investor sentiment may affect stock prices 
independent of future fundamentals, but that influence does not feed 
through to investment. If, conversely, the stock market helps predict 
investment beyond its ability to predict future fundamentals, then 
investor sentiment may independently influence business investment, 
through the channels of false signals, financing costs, and market 
pressure on managers. 
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. In the first section, we review 
the evidence and theory behind the idea that investor sentiment affects 
stock prices. In the second section, we describe several views on why 
the stock market might predict investment, and how investor sentiment 
might itself influence investment through the stock market. In the third 
section, we describe the tests that we use to discover how the stock 
market influences investment. The fourth and fifth sections present 
evidence using firm-level data from the COMPUSTAT data base bearing 
on the alternative views. The next two sections turn to the aggregate 
data that most studies of investment examine. The final section presents 
our conclusions. 
3. Meyer and Kuh (1957). 
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Investor Sentiment and the Stock Market 
Since Robert Shiller's demonstration of the excess volatility of stock 
market prices, research on the efficiency of financial markets has 
exploded.4 In subsequent work, Shiller suggested that fads and fashions, 
as well as fundamentals, influence asset prices.5 Eugene Fama and 
Kenneth French as well as James Poterba and Lawrence Summers have 
managed to detect mean reversion in U.S. stock returns.6 While this 
evidence is consistent with the presence of mean-reverting investor 
sentiment toward stocks, it is also consistent with time-varying required 
returns. Perhaps more compelling evidence on the role of investor 
sentiment comes from the studies of the crash of October 1987. Shiller 
surveyed investors after the crash and found few who thought that 
fundamentals had changed.7 Nejat Seyhun found that corporate insiders 
aggressively bought stocks of their own companies during the crash, and 
made a lot of money doing SO.8 The insiders quite correctly saw no 
change in fundamentals and attributed the crash to a sentiment shift. 
The thrust of the evidence is that stock prices respond not only to news, 
but also to sentiment changes. 
Follow-up studies to the work on mean reversion attempt both to 
prove the influence of investor sentiment on stock prices and to isolate 
measures of sentiment. One group of studies concerns closed-end mutual 
funds-funds that issue a fixed number of shares, and then invest the 
proceeds in other traded securities. If investors want to liquidate their 
holdings in a closed-end fund, they must sell their shares to other 
investors, and cannot just redeem them as in the case of an open-end 
fund. Closed-end funds are extremely useful in financial economics 
because it is possible to observe both their net asset value, which is the 
market value of their stock holdings, and their price, and compare the 
two. A well-known characteristic of closed-end funds is that their stock 
price is often different from their net asset value, suggesting that markets 
are inefficient. 
4. Shiller(1981). 
5. Shiller (1984). 
6. Fama and French (1988); Poterba and Summers (1988). 
7. Shiller (1987). 
8. Seyhun (1990). 
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In fact, Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence Summers, and 
Robert Waldmann, following the work of Martin Zweig, have argued 
that the average discount on closed-end funds can serve as a proxy for 
individual investor sentiment.9 When individual investors are bearish on 
stocks, they sell closed-end funds as well as other stocks. In doing so, 
they drive up the discounts on closed-end funds (that is, their price 
relative to those of the stocks in their portfolio) because institutional 
investors typically do not trade these funds and so do not offset the 
bearishness of individual investors. Conversely, when individuals are 
bullish on stocks, they buy closed-end funds so that discounts narrow 
or even become premiums. Charles Lee, Andrei Shleifer, and Richard 
Thaler present evidence suggesting that discounts might indeed serve as 
a proxy for individual investor sentiment. 10 We will not review the theory 
and evidence here, but will use closed-end fund discounts as one measure 
of investor sentiment, and will study the relationships between discounts, 
investment, and external financing. 
The empirical evidence on the potential importance of investor 
sentiment has been complemented by a range of theoretical arguments 
that explain why the influence of sentiment on stock prices would not be 
eliminated through "arbitrage." Arbitrage in this context does not refer 
to riskless arbitrage, as understood in financial economics, but rather to 
risky, contrarian strategies whereby smart investors bet against the 
mispricing. Stephen Figlewski and Robert Shiller have both pointed out 
that when stock returns are risky, arbitrage of this sort is also risky and 
therefore not completely effective. " I For example, if an arbitrageur buys 
underpriced stocks, he runs the risk that fundamental news will be bad 
and that he will take a bath on what had initially been an attractive trade. 
Because arbitrage is risky, arbitrageurs will limit the size of their trades, 
and investor sentiment will have an effect on prices in equilibrium. 
Others have taken this argument further. 12 They point out that if investor 
sentiment is itself stochastic, it adds further risk to arbitrage because 
sentiment can turn against an arbitrageur with a short horizon. An 
arbitrageur buying underpriced stocks runs the risk that they become 
even more underpriced in the near future, when they might have to be 
9. De Long and others (1990); Zweig (1973). 
10. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990). 
11. Figlewski (1979); Shiller (1984). 
12. De Long and others (1990). 
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sold. This noise-trader risk makes arbitrage even riskier, allowing the 
effects of sentiment on prices to be even more pronounced. The upshot 
of these models is that the theoretical argument that arbitrage prevents 
investor sentiment from influencing prices is simply wrong. 
Most models of investor sentiment deal with sentiment that affects 
the whole stock market or at least a big chunk of it. When sentiment 
affects a large number of securities, leaning against the wind means 
bearing systematic risk, and is therefore costly to risk-averse arbitra- 
geurs. If, in contrast, sentiment affects only a few securities, betting 
against it means bearing only the risk that can be diversified, and therefore 
arbitrageurs will bet more aggressively. Thus, investor sentiment can 
have a pronounced effect on prices only when it affects a large number 
of securities. 
This conclusion holds in a perfect capital market, with no trading 
restrictions or costs of becoming informed about the mispricing of 
securities. More realistically though, arbitrage is a costly activity and 
arbitrage resources will be devoted to particular securities only if returns 
justify bearing the costs. As a result, investor sentiment toward individual 
securities will not be arbitraged away and will affect their prices, because 
arbitrageurs' funds and patience are limited. If a stock is mispriced, only 
a few arbitrageurs would know about it. 13 Those who do know may have 
alternative uses for funds, or may not wait until the mispricing disap- 
pears.14 Waiting is especially costly when arbitrage requires selling a 
security short, and regulations do not give the short seller full use of the 
proceeds. Moreover, taking a large position in a security means bearing 
a large amount of idiosyncratic risk, which is costly to an arbitrageur 
who is not fully diversified. Finally, as stressed by Fischer Black, 
arbitrageurs often cannot be certain how mispriced a security is, further 
limiting their willingness to trade in it.15 All these costs suggest that the 
resources leaning against the mispricing of any given security are quite 
limited, and, therefore, even idiosyncratic investor sentiment may 
influence share prices. 
To conclude, recent research has produced a variety of empirical 
evidence suggesting that investor sentiment influences asset prices. A 
parallel research effort has demonstrated that the usual models in 
13. Merton (1987). 
14. Shleifer and Vishny (1990). 
15. Black (1986). 
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financial economics, in which investors are risk averse, imply that 
investor sentiment should affect prices. The argument that marketwide 
investor sentiment affects prices is particularly strong, but one also 
expects firm-specific sentiment to affect individual stocks. These theo- 
ries and evidence raise the obvious question: does the effect of investor 
sentiment on stock prices feed through to business investment spending? 
To address this question, we first review how stock prices affect 
investment in general. 
The Stock Market and Investment 
The fact that stock returns predict investment is well established. In 
this section, we present the four views that can plausibly account for 
this correlation. In the subsequent sections, we evaluate these views 
empirically. 
The Passive Informant Hypothesis 
According to the passive informant view of the stock market, the 
market does not play an important role in allocating investment funds. 
This view contends that the managers of the firm know more than the 
public or the econometrician about the investment opportunities facing 
the firm. The stock market, therefore, does not provide any information 
that would help the manager make investment decisions. The market 
might tell the manager what market participants think about the firm's 
investments, but that does not influence his decisions. This "sideshow" 
view of the stock market says not only that investor sentiment does not 
affect investment, but also that the manager does not learn anything 
from the stock price. 
The passive informant hypothesis implies that the reason for the 
observed correlation between stock returns and subsequent investment 
growth is that the econometrician's information set is smaller than the 
manager's. If the econometrician knew everything that the manager 
does, the variation in investment could be accounted for using only the 
variables known to the manager when he decided how much to invest. 
The passive informant hypothesis has some intuitive appeal. It is 
plausible that outsiders know very little about the firm that insiders do 
164 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1990 
not also know, since outsiders collect information that is largely devoted 
to understanding insiders' actions. Many a financial analyst's main 
responsibility is talking to company managers. This superiority of 
insiders' knowledge seems especially likely with respect to firm-specific 
fundamentals, where information about the firm is most likely to hit 
managers first. One might argue, however, that the market does teach 
insiders something new about the future state of the aggregate economy 
and so conveys information useful in making investment decisions. 
Some supportforthe passive informant hypothesis comes from studies 
of insider trading.16 Seyhun, for example, shows that insiders make 
money on trading in their firms' stock. Moreover, insiders successfully 
predict both future idiosyncratic returns and future market returns, 
suggesting that insiders' special knowledge helps them with both aggre- 
gate and firm-specific forecasts. At the same time, the evidence does not 
reject the view that even though insiders can forecast some components 
of returns that are firm-specific, they do not forecast other components. 
That is, they can make money trading and still learn something from 
stock returns. They may or may not use this knowledge in making 
investment decisions for their firms. 
The Active Informant Hypothesis 
The active informant hypothesis assigns a greater role to the stock 
market. It says that stock prices predict investment because they convey 
to managers information useful in making investment decisions. This 
information can accurately, or inaccurately, predict fundamentals. Even 
when the stock market is the best available predictor, it can err due to 
the inherent unpredictability of the fundamentals, or because stock 
prices are contaminated by sentiment that managers cannot separate 
from information about fundamentals. Even if the stock market sends 
an inaccurate signal, the information may still be used and so the stock 
return will influence investment. 
The market can convey a variety of information that bears on the 
intrinsic uncertainty facing a firm-such as future aggregate or individual 
demand. Alternatively, the market can reveal investors' assessment of 
the competence of a firm's managers and their ability to make good 
16. Seyhun (1986, 1988). 
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investments. Information conveyed by stock prices can also help resolve 
extrinsic or equilibrium uncertainty. For example, if an economy can be 
in one of several self-fulfilling equilibria, the stock market can aggregate 
beliefs-act as a "sunspot' -regarding which equilibrium is at work. 
Of course, this type of role can be played by the aggregate stock market 
only; it is not a consideration when evaluating the dependence of 
individual firms' decisions on their idiosyncratic returns. 
We distinguish this sunspot role of the stock market from the influence 
of investor sentiment. If the stock market is a sunspot, all investors are 
rational and correctly predict the future state of the economy based on 
stock market performance. In this case, the stock market does not 
predict investment, after controlling for future fundamentals, because it 
is perfectly correlated with future fundamentals. In contrast, investors 
affected by sentiment hold erroneous beliefs about the future. If such 
investors affect stock prices, and if managers pay attention to stock 
prices and cannot separate investor sentiment from fundamental infor- 
mation, then investment decisions will be distorted by false signals from 
the market. In this case, then, the stock market will be a faulty active 
informant and will predict future investment even after controlling for 
future fundamentals. 
The difference between the faulty informant and accurate informant 
hypotheses is a matter of degree, and can be explored empirically. If 
signals are relatively accurate and future fundamentals are controlled 
for, the stock market should not help predict investment. By contrast, if 
investor sentiment influences the stock market, and these false signals 
influence investment, then the stock market should influence investment 
even after controlling for future fundamentals. In our empirical work, 
we test for this difference. 
One final point is that the false signals hypothesis seems less likely to 
apply to individual stock returns than to industry stock returns or to the 
market as a whole. It is easier to argue that managers learn more new 
things from the stock market about the economy as a whole or about 
industry conditions than they do about their own firms. On the other 
hand, it is quite possible that managers change their actions in response 
to idiosyncratic stock returns because they don't want to be fired or 
taken over-but that is a story we will address later. The false signals 
hypothesis is more plausible at the aggregate level, when managers are 
confused by the aggregate market and respond accordingly. For example, 
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there was a very brief slowdown in investment following the crash of 
October 1987, when managers had to combine their own information 
with what turned out to be a highly misleading signal from the stock 
market. 
The Financing Hypothesis 
According to the two previous hypotheses, the stock market's main 
role is to convey information: in the first case to the econometrician, and 
in the second case to the manager. The next two views assign the stock 
market a more active role. Many people believe that the stock market 
plays a key role in helping firms raise capital. This applies to new firms, 
in the case of initial public offerings (IPOs), and to more seasoned firms. 
The valuation that the market assigns to a company's equity determines 
the cost of capital to that company, a point made by Stanley Fischer and 
Robert Merton among others. 17 The higher the valuation, the cheaper is 
the equity. When the stock market is efficient, firms cannot find a 
particularly advantageous time to undertake equity finance. However, 
when the stock market is subject to investor sentiment, firms can choose 
equity finance when the market overvalues them, making the cost of 
capital irrationally low. 
As pointed out by Olivier Blanchard, Changyong Rhee, and Lawrence 
Summers, in a sentiment-infected stock market, rational managers might 
not invest the proceeds from a new share issue.'8 Fischer and Merton 
presume that firms for which funds are irrationally cheap will invest in 
marginal projects. At a rational cost of funds, these projects would have 
a negative net present value. 19 Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers point out 
that firms instead may issue the overvalued equity and then invest the 
proceeds in financial securities, which are zero net-present-value in- 
vestments, rather than in negative net-present-value projects. In other 
words, firms issue equity when equity is overpriced, but issue debt or 
finance internally when equity is not overpriced; investment is the same 
in either case. The Blanchard-Rhee-Summers view implies that even if 
17. Fischer and Merton (1984). 
18. Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1990). 
19. Fischer and Merton (1984). 
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investor sentiment affects stock prices, it does not necessarily affect 
investment, only the way in which it is financed. 
Of course, in some cases one would expect investor sentiment to 
affect investment through the issuance of new securities. For example, 
take a firm that has limited debt capacity and that cannot raise all the 
funds through borrowing that it could profitably invest. For this firm, 
the marginal return on investment exceeds the risk-adjusted cost of 
funds in a perfect capital market. If this firm, because of an irrational 
rise in its stock price, can get access to cheaper financing through the 
stock market, it would use the proceeds from the equity issue to invest. 
In this case, the marginal investment has a positive rather than a negative 
net present value, and is worth undertaking. On this reasoning, the 
influence of equity issuance on investment would be especially strong 
for smaller firms. 
The discussion so far, as well as most of the literature, explains how 
stock market valuation determines the attractiveness of stock financing. 
But, for a variety of reasons, it also helps determine the attractiveness 
of bond financing and may, therefore, have a bigger effect on investment. 
While investor pessimism might simply cause the firm to switch from 
equity to debt financing, this substitution will be limited if the market 
value of the firm's debt deteriorates at the same time. The stock market 
conveys information about how much a company is worth. Potential 
lenders presumably use this information in deciding how much to lend 
and on what terms. Therefore, stock price increases would increase debt 
capacity and reduce the costs of debt, and the reverse would be true for 
stock price decreases. In addition, a critical determinant of debt capacity 
is how much the assets of the firm could be sold for should the firm fail 
to meet its debt obligations and therefore need to sell some assets. The 
more valuable the firm, the higher the prices its assets will fetch on 
resale, and therefore the greater the firm's debt capacity. In this way, an 
increase in the market value of the firm should also make debt financing 
of this firm more attractive. 
The implication of the financing hypothesis-concerning both equity 
and debt finance-is that the key channel of the stock market's influence 
on investment is through the issuance of new securities. The hypothesis 
also implies that this channel is more important for smaller firms, 
particularly new firms that do not yet have public equity. If stock prices 
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have an important influence on financing decisions, there should be 
considerable room for investor sentiment to affect investment. 
The Stock Market Pressure Hypothesis 
Even without conveying any information to the managers, or affecting 
the cost of security issues, the stock market can influence investment by 
exerting pressure on managers. For example, if investors dislike oil 
companies and drive down the prices of their shares, then, for fear of 
being fired or taken over, managers of oil companies might try to disinvest 
and diversify, even if further investment in oil is profitable. If market 
participants vote their sentiment by selling and buying stocks, and if the 
hiring and firing of managers is tied to the performance of the stock, then 
these votes will affect investment even if they are uninformed. 
One particular version of this hypothesis is the short horizons theory .20 
When arbitrage funds are limited, smart investors are reluctant to buy 
and hold underpriced, long-term investment projects because mispricing 
takes a long time to be corrected.2' Managers who are averse to low 
stock prices, for fear of being fired or taken over, will avoid these long- 
term investments even if these projects have a positive net present value. 
Thus, investor sentiment can affect investment. 
The crucial implication here is that the stock market has an influence 
on investment beyond its influence through financing costs and beyond 
its ability to predict future fundamentals. After controlling for financing 
costs and fundamentals, the stock market still affects investment. In this 
respect, the market pressure hypothesis resembles the faulty informant 
version of the active predictor hypothesis. The main difference is that 
false signals are most likely to be listened to when they come from the 
aggregate market, but are unlikely to influence an individual firm's 
managers when they are idiosyncratic. In contrast, while the market 
pressure hypothesis may apply on the aggregate level, it is most plausible 
at the individual firm level. Therefore, the finding of a residual role for 
the stock market would have different interpretations in aggregate and 
cross-sectional regressions. 
20. Stein (1988); Shleifer and Vishny (1990). 
21. Shleifer and Vishny (1990). 
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Empirical Design 
The empirical approach taken in this paper is somewhat atheoretical. 
We use a fairly unstructured approach, placing few restrictions on how 
stock returns enter the investment equations in order to allow the 
maximum scope for the stock market to affect investment. For our 
analysis, we regress investment growth on stock returns and the growth 
in fundamental variables in order to see how important he stock market 
is after controlling for fundamentals. The idea of these regressions is to 
ask, "If managers knew future fundamentals, would orthogonal move- 
ments in share price still help predict their investment decisions?" 
We do not attempt to estimate consistently the structural parameters 
of the investment and financing equations, as we are not prepared to 
make the necessary identifying assumptions. Realizing that investment, 
financing, and fundamentals are all simultaneously determined, we still 
wish to interpret our quasi-reduced-form results as evidence on a more 
narrow question-the incremental explanatory power of the stock mar- 
ket in predicting investment. Even with this more modest objective in 
mind, our interpretation of the evidence still rests on several key 
assumptions discussed below. 
To identify the role of investor sentiment, we focus on the merits of 
the faulty informant, financing, and market pressure views of the stock 
market, with the caveat that the faulty informant view makes more sense 
in aggregate data than in cross-sectional data.22 The financing view 
predicts that the main link from the stock market to investment is through 
financing; therefore, we examine financing data to evaluate this view. 
Our tests of the faulty informant and market pressure views are less 
direct. Essentially, these views maintain that the stock market plays an 
independent role in predicting investment beyond the information it 
provides about future fundamentals and beyond its effect on financing. 
It is important o stress that we can never reject the null hypothesis that 
investor sentiment does not affect investment through the stock market. 
22. Because the accurate active informant view involves perfectly correct signals 
about future fundamentals, there is no room for the irrational influence of investor 
sentiment. This hypothesis, therefore, is irrelevant to this discussion. We also ignore for 
the time being the passive informant view because in it the stock market, and thereby 
investor sentiment, do not influence investment. 
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It could be that the ability of the stock market to predict investment 
simply reflects the econometrician's inability to properly measure the 
fundamentals that drive both investment and the stock market. 
To implement the tests, we run four main types of regressions. In a 
general form, 
(1) Al, = f[AF,], 
(2) Al, = f[AF,, Rt_ J 
(3) At = f[AFt, ANt], 
(4) AIt = fAFt, ANt, R,t 1], 
where Al, is the investment growth rate in year t, AF, is the growth rate 
of fundamentals-cash flow and sales-in year t, R,_ 1 is the stock return 
in year t - 1, and AN, is the form of financing in year t, which includes 
debt, and equity issues.23 Like most researchers, we run all our regres- 
sions in changes rather than levels because residuals in the levels 
regressions are serially correlated. For example, in the firm-level data 
the "fixed effect" is the dominant influence in the investment-level 
equations, and one gets little information about what drives year-to-year 
changes in investment from these equations. Moreover, the cross- 
sectional relation between the fixed effect and the fundamentals produces 
some perverse results, with nothing but industry having much explana- 
tory power. 
The financing hypothesis says that adding financing variables should 
help explain the variation in investment. The coefficients on the financing 
variables in equation 3 should be significant and large, and the incremen- 
tal R2, as we move from equation 1 to equation 3, should be large. 
Moreover, if financing really is the main channel through which the stock 
market affects investment, then moving from equation 3 to equation 4 
should produce an insignificant coefficient on the lagged market return, 
and should certainly not raise the R2 much. Finally, if the financing view 
is important, then, as we move from equation 2 to equation 4, the 
coefficient on the lagged return should fall, since the sensitivity of 
investment to return should be reduced once the financing variables are 
included in the regression. 
The faulty informant and market pressure hypotheses say that stock 
returns should help explain investment beyond their ability to predict 
23. A slightly richer lag structure is allowed for in the aggregate data. 
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the firm's fundamental conditions and beyond their impact on financing. 
If so, the coefficient on R,_ should be significant in equation 2, and the 
R2 in equation 2 should be much larger than in equation 1. Also, when 
we control for financing as well as for fundamentals, the return variable 
in equation 4 should be significant and the incremental R2 in equation 4 
relative to equation 3 should be large. If the stock return has significant 
explanatory power for investment beyond its effect on fundamentals 
and financing, market sentiment very possibly influences investment. 
Of course, we may not have specified the full set of fundamentals. In 
that case, the stock market matters only to the extent that we have an 
omitted variable, and the role of investor sentiment may evaporate with 
its inclusion. That is, the stock market may prove an "accurate passive 
informant" even if we find that equation 4 explains investment much 
better than equation 3. Our exercise is still useful, however, because the 
incremental R2, as we move from equation 3 to equation 4, is an estimated 
upper bound on how much of the variation in investment can be explained 
by sentiment. A small incremental R2 implies that investor sentiment is 
probably not very important. If the R2 is large, the presumption that 
sentiment is important gains strength. 
This approach raises several conceptual issues. First, our market 
value variable is a stock return rather than a change in q, the ratio of the 
firm's market value to replacement cost.24 Since both the capital stock 
and the market value of debt move much more slowly than the market 
value of equity, the practical difference between using stock returns and 
changes in q is fairly small. Robert Barro conducts an empirical race 
between these approaches, and finds that the data favor stock returns 
over changes in q.25 He attributes this finding to the fact that the capital 
stock is measured with error. Because we are interested in allowing the 
maximum scope for the stock market to predict investment, we use 
returns rather than changes in q in our analysis. 
Second, by focusing only on the incremental explanatory power of 
stock returns, we may underestimate the scope for sentiment to influence 
investment. Because sales, cash flow, and investment are all simulta- 
neously determined, some of the investment variation explained by sales 
may actually be driven by stock returns. For example, suppose that a 
24. Since Brainard and Tobin (1968) first used q, many others have followed in their 
steps-Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1990), Hayashi (1982), and Summers (1981). 
25. Barro (1990). 
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good stock return raises investment, which in turn improves sales 
through larger capacity or lower variable costs. Controlling for sales, 
we might find only a small effect of the stock return on investment, even 
when the true effect is large. We argue below that the data do not support 
this view, and assume that, at least over our one- to three-year estimation 
period, stock returns are not an important driving force behind the sales 
process. 
A related concern is that investor sentiment is sometimes considered 
an overreaction to fundamental news. In fact, some recent evidence on 
stock returns suggests that fads and fundamentals are positively corre- 
lated.26 If so, we may be underestimating the explanatory power of 
investor sentiment, because our tests focus only on its incremental 
explanatory power over and above fundamentals. The power of our tests 
will be particularly low if the stock market overreacts to fundamentals 
in a uniform fashion across all firms at all times. If this is not the case, 
however, our tests should detect some of the effects of overreaction. 
Our only goal is to calibrate the role of investor sentiment that is 
orthogonal to fundamentals. 
A final conceptual issue is how to measure the importance of sentiment 
in explaining investment. Focusing on the incremental R2 and the 
parameter estimate on stock returns, we pretty much ignore t-statistics 
in the firm-level regressions. We do so because most variables are highly 
significant with several thousand observations. The t-statistics will play 
a larger role in our discussion of the aggregate time series evidence. 
We do not rely on R2 to choose between two specifications on a 
statistical basis. Rather we use incremental R2's to gauge the fraction of 
all investment variation that is conceivably due to investor sentiment. 
Because investment is extraordinarily volatile, especially at the firm 
level, even fairly large regression estimates of the marginal effect of 
stock returns may not explain much of the variation in investment. A 
large coefficient on stock prices indicates that the stock market can help 
predict significant changes in investment. Yet, if the incremental R2 is 
low, an irrational stock market is an unlikely cause of widespread under- 
or overinvestment in many sectors of the economy, since stock market 
behavior helps predict only a small fraction of the variation in investment. 
26. Barsky and De Long (1989); Campbell and Kyle (1988). 
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Evidence from Firm-Level Data 
Most of the recent empirical work on the ability of stock returns to 
forecast investment has focused on aggregate data. Yet we would argue 
that cross-sectional data are equally important. The distortion of the 
allocation of capital across firms that could arise from deviant share 
prices may be a greater source of harm than the false signals that distort 
aggregate investment. Investment variation over the business cycle 
caused by false signals from the stock market largely amounts to 
intertemporal substitution of investment. Misallocation of capital across 
sectors, however, can lead to more permanent damage, as socialist 
economies illustrate. Also, it seems likely that the stock market allocates 
investment across sectors and firms through relative share prices more 
than it allocates investment over time through the variation in returns 
over time. We therefore begin by examining the relationship between 
relative stock returns and investment. 
Our main empirical results are based on the analysis of annual data 
from the COMPUSTAT data base between 1960 and 1987. The sample 
was constructed by Bronwyn Hall.27 Because the coverage of firms by 
COMPUSTAT has expanded greatly over time, we have only 93 firms 
in 1960, rising to 1,032 firms in 1987. The sources and construction of all 
the data are described in the appendix. 
The investment variable we use is the growth rate of real capital 
expenditures excluding acquisitions. The two measures of fundamentals 
are the growth rates of sales and cash flow, which we believe are the 
most important fundamental determinants of investment. We use sales 
growth as a measure of fundamentals because it reflects future demand 
for the firm's products and serves as a measure of investment profitabil- 
ity. Cash flow measures fundamentals both because it reflects current 
(and presumably future) profitability and because it facilitates investment 
if a firm is constrained in the capital market.28 Our cash flow variable is 
after-tax corporate profits (net of interest payments) plus depreciation, 
and therefore closely approximates the inflow of funds available for 
investment. We have also experimented with other proxies, such as 
27. Cummins, Hall, Laderman, and Mundy (1988). 
28. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). 
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different lags on sales and cash flow growth, but these variables did not 
noticeably increase the R2. 
The construction of new debt and new share issue variables is 
described in the appendix. Instead of using a continuous variable equal 
to the percent increase in actual debt or shares outstanding, we use 
dummy variables. The equity dummy variable equals 1 if a firm increased 
its equity by more than 5 percent and the debt dummy equals 1 if a firm 
increased its debt by more than 10 percent in the annual data. At three- 
year frequencies we use cutoffs of 10 percent for equity issues and 20 
percent for debt issues. We use dummies rather than continuous variables 
because the data on security issues have many errors as well as many 
outliers. Some of these outliers may be traced to security issues made in 
conjunction with large acquisitions. Recall that we exclude acquisitions 
in our measure of capital expenditures. As a practical matter, using 
dummies rather than continuous variables results in a higher explanatory 
power of the regressions, so we are giving the financing hypothesis the 
benefit of the doubt.29 In the financing section, we also present results 
on dollar proceeds from external financing normalized by investment. 
Development of the Empirical Model 
Because we are looking at a cross-section of firms, we compute capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) alphas (abnormal returns) for all firms. We 
do that by regressing each firm's returns net of Treasury bill (T-bill) 
returns on the return of the value-weighted market index net of the T- 
bill return, using monthly data for the whole sample period. The 
regression coefficient on market return is the firm's beta, which is 
assumed to be constant during the whole period. We then define alpha 
as the residual in the regression for each firm. In a given year, alpha is 
the firm's excess stock return in that year, where returns are cumulated 
exponentially. 
If the CAPM is an inappropriate model for generating expected 
returns, our alphas may compensate for risks that are not allowed for by 
the CAPM. In that case, a high alpha may be due to a high expected 
29. Theoretically, it is not clear whether changes in investment should be predicted by 
the level of issuing activity or by the changes in issuing activity. Using changes has the 
problem that changes are negative after a large issue. The explanatory power of the 
specification in changes is also inferior to that in levels. 
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return that is simply compensation for the firm being riskier than implied 
by its market beta alone. Thus, while an unexpectedly high return may 
lead to a rise in investment, a high alpha due to a high expected return 
should not, and its presence will tend to bias the coefficient on alpha 
downward. Because firms may face different risks and different expected 
returns than implied by the CAPM, we have also estimated residuals 
from a market model that allows firms to have different expected returns 
even after controlling for beta. (Of course over any 15- to 20-year period 
the firm's average return may be due as much to luck as to expected 
return.) Using these market-model residuals rather than CAPM alphas 
changes the marginal explanatory power of the stock market in our 
investment equations by less than half of 1 percent. 
Table 1 describes some of the variables. The top panel contains 
univariate statistics for our variables measured at annual frequencies. 
Investment growth is extraordinarily volatile. Over the period 1960-87, 
the mean investment growth rate is 23.7 percent, but the median is only 
4.7 percent: there are quite a few small firms with enormous growth 
rates. In this sample, one-quarter of the observations, which are firm- 
years, have experienced investment growth rates of over 43 percent, 
and another quarter had investment declines of over 25 percent. The 
mean and the median cash flow growth rates are both around 5 percent. 
The mean sales growth rate is 6.5 percent, but the median is only 4.3 
percent, again pointing to the presence of a few, very rapidly growing 
small firms. While the median alpha is close to zero, the mean of 0.07 
indicates either a survivorship bias in COMPUSTAT or else some quirks 
in the CAPM. To partially address the survivorship bias, we have 
included the companies from the COMPUSTAT Research File in our 
sample, but, unfortunately, it does not include all firms that have 
disappeared from COMPUSTAT. In any case, the non-zero mean alpha 
should not affect the interpretation of our tests, which largely exploit 
cross-sectional variation in alphas. 
In the sample of annual data, 10 percent of the firm-years show 
increases in outstanding equity shares of more than 5 percent, and over 
30 percent of the firm-years show increases of book debt of more than 
10 percent. For the firms that increased equity by more than 5 percent, 
the median ratio of the equity issue to investment is 0.91 and the mean 
is 1.47. For the firms that increased their debt by more than 10 percent, 
the median ratio of the debt issue to investment is 0.74 and the mean is 
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Table 1. Description of Firm-Level Financial Variables, One- and Three-Year 
Spans, 1960-87 
Standard 
Variable Median Mean deviation Minimum Maximum 
One-year spana 
Investment growthb 0.047 0.237 0.911 -1.00 10.00 
Alphac - 0.003 0.070 0.441 -0.94 9.68 
Cash flow growthd 0.056 0.046 0.878 -9.86 9.92 
Sales growth 0.043 0.065 0.258 - 1.00 7.09 
New share dummye 0 0.104 0.305 0 1 
New debt dummy' 0 0.312 0.463 0 1 
Three-year spang 
Investment growthb 0.097 0.482 1.390 - 1.00 10.00 
Alphac -0.004 0.205 0.930 -0.98 14.80 
Cash flow growthd 0.123 0.209 1.060 -9.78 9.63 
Sales growth 0.113 0.199 0.529 - 1.00 8.75 
New share dummye 0 0.197 0.398 0 1 
New debt dummy' 0 0.408 0.492 0 1 
Source: COMPUSTAT data base and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data base, at the Graduate 
School, University of Chicago. 
a. The sample for the annual analysis has 27,771 observations. 
b. Investment is defined as "capital expenditures" from annual statement of changes in financial position, from 
COMPUSTAT, including COMPUSTAT Research File, 1959-87. 
c. Alpha is the lagged abnormal stock returns. CAPM betas were estimated for each firm using all available 
monthly returns from CRSP, 1959-87. These betas were then used to calculate an alpha for each year. 
d. Cash flow equals net income plus depreciation. 
e. New share issue is the sale of common equity divided by the total market value of common equity at the 
beginning of the year, from COMPUSTAT, 1971-87. Where the above data were unavailable, including the years 
1959-70, sale of common equity was estimated from the change in the number of shares outstanding reported in 
CRSP, filtering out changes due to liquidation, rights offering, stock splits, or stock dividends. 
f. New debt issues is the change in book debt divided by the lagged value of book debt. 
g. The sample for the three-year analysis has 7,950 observations. 
1.30. These results show that outside financing roughly matches invest- 
ment needs over a one-year period, although firms also have their internal 
cash flows. It appears that firms issue much more than they need for 
immediate investment. When we compute similar numbers over a three- 
year horizon, the number of firms that finance in excess of investment 
drops considerably. 
The bottom panel of table 1 contains univariate statistics for our 
variables measured over nonoverlapping three-year periods. Again, the 
high degree of volatility of investment is confirmed. The standard 
deviation of investment growth is now 139 percent. Over an average 
three-year period, investment rises by more than 77 percent for a quarter 
of all firm-period observations. Roughly 20 percent of all firms expand 
their outstanding shares by 10 percent or more over a three-year period 
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while 41 percent of firms expand their book debt by 20 percent or more. 
Of those expanding equity shares by 10 percent or more, the median 
ratio of proceeds to three years' worth of investment is 0.46, while the 
mean is 0.81. The comparable numbers for those expanding debt by 20 
percent or more are 0.44 and 0.75 respectively. These three-year pro- 
ceeds-to-investment numbers are significantly lower than the one-year 
numbers. 
A key question in our empirical analysis is over which horizon to 
estimate our growth rate regressions. They can be estimated over 
relatively short time periods, such as single years, or over relatively long 
time periods, such as three to four years. The problem with estimating 
over one-year periods is that the regression would not capture delayed 
changes in investment due to large changes in the firm's stock market 
valuation or in fundamental variables. As a practical matter, the explan- 
atory power of all variables is quite low when investment growth 
equations are estimated annually. 
On the other hand, as the horizon gets longer endogeneity problems 
become worse. One potential problem is the feedback from investment 
to sales discussed above. Another is that we move closer to estimating 
an identity between sources and uses of funds, though we are still very 
far from it. The right-hand side of our equation does not include 
dividends, acquisitions, or accumulation of liquid assets. All things 
considered, we prefer the three-year specification to the one-year 
specification.30 
Regression of the Stock Market's Influence on Investment 
The basic regressions for nonoverlapping three-year periods are 
presented in table 2. In these regressions, we use contemporaneous 
fundamentals, financing variables, and stock returns (represented by 
alpha) lagged one year. That is, we measure investment growth from 
year t to year t + 3 and the stock return from year t - 1 to year t + 2. 
All equations are estimated using a dummy variable for each three-year 
time period. We have also estimated these regressions using industry- 
period dummies. The results are not qualitatively different, but the 
30. In regressions run using annual data, we found extremely low R2 's even in equations 
including both the stock returns and fundamental variables. For this reason, we proceed 
to the three-year egressions. 
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Table 2. Regressions of Growth in Real Investment on Selected Financial Variables, 
Firm-Level Data over Three-Year Spans, 1960-87 
Independent variables 
Cash New New 
flow Sales share debt 
Equation Alpha growth growth dummy dummy R2 
2.1 0.525 ... ... ... ... 0.157 
(32.7) 
2.2 ... 0.182 0.851 ... ... 0.208 
(12.0) (27.9) 
2.3 0.331 0.126 0.707 .. ... 0.246 
(20.1) (8.4) (23.1) 
2.4 ... 0.190 0.725 0.155 0.350 0.224 
(12.7) (22.7) (4.3) (11.8) 
2.5 0.323 0.136 0.594 0.123 0.333 0.260 
(19.7) (9.1) (18.7) (3.5) (11.5) 
2.6 0.328 0.125 0.686 0.133 . . . 0.248 
(19.9) (8.3) (22.1) (3.7) 
2.7 0.325 0.138 0.613 . . . 0.336 0.259 
(19.9) (9.2) (19.5) (11.6) 
Source: Authors' own calculations using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data bases with 7,950 observations from 1963- 
87. See table 1 for an explanation of variables. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
abnormal stock return does have noticeably lower incremental explan- 
atory power. Omitting the industry-period dummies leaves more room 
for relative stock returns across sectors to predict differences in invest- 
ment growth. 
Equation 2.1 confirms the basic starting point of this paper-that 
stock returns predict investment. The parameter estimate suggests that 
a 10 percent excess return on a firm's stock over three years predicts an 
average 5.3 percent increase in annual investment by the end of the three 
years. The t-statistic is quite large, which is to be expected with this 
many observations. The explanatory power of this regression is 15.7 
percent (13.1 percent without time-period dummies)-a respectable R2 
for relative stock returns, but less impressive considering that the stock 
return variable picks up the effect of any omitted fundamental variables. 
Equation 2.2 shows that our two fundamental variables, sales growth 
and cash flow growth, can explain 20.8 percent of the variation in 
investment over a three-year period. Both variables are significant: a 10 
percent growth in sales is associated with an 8.5 percent growth in 
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investment over three years; a 10 percent growth in cash flow leads to a 
1.8 percent growth in investment. 
Equation 2.3 represents one test of the hypothesis that the stock 
market influences investment beyond its ability to predict future funda- 
mentals, since the equation includes contemporaneous fundamentals 
together with the lagged stock return. Not surprisingly, the coefficient 
on alpha drops by about 40 percent from its level in equation 2.1. When 
future fundamentals are held constant, the responsiveness of investment 
to lagged stock returns is significantly smaller. The incremental R2 of 
equation 2.3 is only 3.8 percent relative to that of equation 2.2. The 
lagged abnormal return explains only 3.8 percent of the variation in 
investment beyond what can be explained by fundamentals. This incre- 
mental R2 is an estimated upper bound on how much investor sentiment 
toward individual stocks can affect investment.3' Presumably, if we 
could measure and include other fundamental determinants of invest- 
ment in the regression, the incrementalR2 would be even smaller. Simply 
by including the available crude measures of fundamentals, we can cut 
down the incremental explanatory power of relative stock returns by 
more than 70 percent, which seems to indicate that their ability to predict 
investment is largely based on their correlation with future fundamentals. 
The comparison of equations 2.2 and 2.3 illustrates the general finding 
of this paper. The coefficient on the abnormal return, controlling for the 
fundamentals, is both statistically and economically significant. A 30 
percent abnormal stock return over three years, which is large but not 
unusual, is associated with a 10 percent extra growth in investment over 
three years. So high stock returns indeed predict high investment. At 
the same time, because investment is so volatile, the incremental 
explanatory power of the stock market is typically small; in this case it 
is only 3.8 percent. Thus, variation in relative market valuation across 
firms and sectors cannot account for much of the variation in investment. 
Although equation 2.3 shows that lagged stock returns do not explain 
much of the variation in investment, it does not distinguish between the 
31. This interpretation depends on our treating the fundamentals from equation 2.2 as 
the primary explanatory variables. Absent these priors, it would be just as appropriate to 
interpret he incremental R2 when fundamentals are added to equation 2.1 as the indepen- 
dent contribution of the fundamentals. This would leave the upper bound on possible 
independent effects from stock prices and investor sentiment uncertain. 
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financing and the market pressure hypotheses. Equations 2.4-2.7 present 
some results using financing variables. Equation 2.4 shows that both 
contemporaneous stock and bond financing are positively correlated 
with investment. Firms that expand outstanding shares by 10 percent or 
more over three years on average show 16 percent higher investment 
growth than firms that do not expand their shares by so much, whereas 
firms that make a 20 percent or more bond issue on average show 35 
percent higher investment growth. These magnitudes are fairly large, 
and the coefficients are estimated fairly precisely. The incremental R2 of 
this regression, relative to equation 2.2 with fundamentals alone, is 1.6 
percent. So financing can explain a bit more of the variation in investment 
than fundamentals alone. Presumably, the explanatory power of relative 
stock returns for investment through financing is a strict subset of this 
explanatory power. 
Equation 2.5 adds the lagged stock return to equation 2.4. These 
results indicate that the stock market influences investment beyond its 
influence on financing, consistent with the faulty informant and market 
pressure hypotheses. At the same time, the incremental R2 of this 
equation relative to equation 2.4 is only 3.6 percent. There is not much 
room for investor sentiment to predict investment. 
One interesting question is how much of the explanatory power of the 
financing variables comes from share issues and how much from debt 
issues. Equations 2.6 and 2.7 address this question. Equation 2.6 shows 
that, with the debt dummy omitted, the R2 drops from 0.26 to 0.25, and 
equation 2.7 shows that, with the equity dummy omitted, the R2 does 
not really drop at all. Debt financing explains a greater fraction of 
the variation in investment than equity financing. Since stock returns 
presumably exert a greater influence on stock than on bond financing, 
this result does not bode well for the importance of the financing view of 
the stock market's impact on investment. 
Interpretations and Alternative Specifications 
The small incremental explanatory power of stock market variables, 
controlling for fundamentals, suggests that either the market does not 
matter much or we have misspecified the regressions. We have already 
mentioned that in some ways our incremental R2 overstates the incre- 
mental explanatory power of the stock market, since some fundamental 
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determinants of investment have been left out of the regression. We 
have tried adding further measures of fundamentals, such as more lags 
on cash flow and sales growth, but these do not seem to help explain 
investment or reduce the explanatory power of returns. 
There are also reasons why the stock market may be more important 
than we estimate. First, we may have used the wrong lag structure-the 
stock market may anticipate investment at either a longer or shorter 
horizon than we specified in table 2. We have experimented with several 
alternative lag structures. When the stock return is contemporaneous 
with the fundamentals, using alpha from t to t + 3 rather than t - 1 to 
t + 2, the R2 for equation 2.1 is 0.12, and for equation 2.3 is 0.23. We 
have also allowed for returns to be measured over a longer period and 
with longer lags, but the incremental R2 for the stock return is always 
lower than in table 2. Another possibility is to break up the three-year 
return into its component parts so that the return from t - 1 to t + 2 is 
replaced by the returns from t - 1 to t, from t to t + 1, and from t + 1 
to t + 2. This change actually does raise the explanatory power of stock 
returns, but only slightly; the R2 in the analog of equation 2.3 rises by a 
small amount. None of our alternative specifications of the effect of 
relative stock returns on investment has noticeably more explanatory 
power than the one we report in table 2. 
Second, we may have underestimated the effect of the stock market 
by focusing only on relative stock returns and by using time-period 
dummies instead of the return on the aggregate stock market over time. 
We discuss the effects of the aggregate stock market at a later point in 
the paper. Here we report what happens when we substitute the return 
on the value-weighted stock market for time dummies.32 The marginal 
explanatory power of the aggregate stock return in these equations is 
quite low. The R2 in equation 2.3, without time dummies, rises by only 
0.2 percent when the aggregate stock market is added to the regression. 
This finding makes sense if variation in investment growth in response 
to idiosyncratic factors accounts for most of the variation of investment 
in the pooled time-series/cross-section data. 
As we discussed above, we are also concerned that stock returns 
drive the sales-cash flow process and that the effect of stock returns is 
therefore larger than the effect implied by its incremental explanatory 
32. We use the value-weighted index developed by the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. 
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power over and above fundamental variables. Most importantly, the 
stock market may be influencing sales through investment. In our view, 
the data do not much support this possibility. One reason is that the 
coefficient on sales growth seems too low to be driven by feedback from 
investment to sales. The point estimates in table 2 indicate that a doubling 
of sales over three years is associated with a roughly 70 percent increase 
in investment. Given that the average ratio of investment to the capital 
stock is 8 percent, this means that a 70 percent increase in investment 
roughly corresponds to raising the capital stock by an additional 5.6 
percent each year. Over three years, the capital stock would grow 17 
percent. Hence over three years a doubling of sales is associated with a 
17 percent increase in the capital stock. This seems to us to be too large 
an effect on sales to be driven by the increased investment itself. 
Another piece of evidence against the investment to sales feedback is 
the following. If autonomous changes in investment feed into sales and 
largely account for the correlation between sales and investment, then 
sales should not explain the same variation in investment as the stock 
market. More plausibly, both increased sales and a high stock return are 
associated with widely recognized investment opportunities; therefore, 
they both explain much of the same variation in investment. 
Finally, the observed weak relation between external financing and 
investment along with the weak correlation between stock returns and 
external financing represents more direct evidence that external financ- 
ing, the most plausible mechanism for stock returns to affect investment, 
does not appear to be important. 
We should also briefly mention that we ran regressions in which 
investment growth is measured over a four-year period. In these regres- 
sions using time period dummies, the R2 of the stock market alone is 17.5 
percent, that of fundamentals alone is 22.9 percent, and that of the 
market and fundamentals together is 26.5 percent. The market again has 
a small incremental R2. The incremental explanatory power of the 
financing variables is less than 2 percent. 
The financing hypothesis predicts that the influence of the stock 
market should be particularly great for smaller firms, which rely to a 
greater extent on external financing. One could also imagine that the 
smaller firms are more sensitive to pressure from the stock market. To 
examine these issues, we have reestimated our three-year regression for 
"small" firms. We define a firm as "small" if, when it entered COM- 
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Table 3. Regressions of Growth in Real Investment for Small Firms on Selected 
Financial Variables, Firm-Level Data over Three-Year Spans, 196087a 
Independent variables 
Cash New New 
flow Sales share debt 
Equation Alpha growth growth dummy dummy R2 
3.1 0.412 ... ... ... ... 0.134 
(13.4) 
3.2 ... 0.166 0.773 ... ... 0.177 
(5.6) (12.0) 
3.3 0.245 0.120 0.648 ... ... 0.199 
(7.6) (4.0) (9.8) 
3.4 ... 0.170 0.619 0.218 0.459 0.196 
(5.8) (9.2) (2.6) (6.4) 
3.5 0.234 0.127 0.511 0.158 0.449 0.216 
(7.3) (4.3) (7.5) (1.9) (6.4) 
3.6 0.238 0.118 0.628 0.175 . . . 0.201 
(7.3) (4.0) (9.4) (2.1) 
3.7 0.240 0.128 0.528 . . . 0.453 0.215 
(7.5) (4.4) (7.8) (6.4) 
Source: Authors' own calculations using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data bases with 2,042 observations every third 
year from 1963-87. See table I for a description of the variables. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
a. A firm is classified as "small" if it falls in the bottom quintile of all COMPUSTAT firms in terms of the market 
value of equity the first year it entered the survey. 
PUSTAT, it fell in the bottom quintile of all COMPUSTAT firms 
measured by the market value of equity. This definition ensures that we 
do not make our classification based on in-sample performance. Table 3 
presents the results. Overall, "small" firms do not appear to be very 
different from the rest of the sample. The stock market by itself explains 
13.4 percent of the variation in investment-less than in the whole 
sample. Fundamentals explain 17.7 percent of the variation in invest- 
ment, compared to 20.8 percent in the whole sample. This is not 
surprising, since for smaller firms the more distant fundamentals are 
probably a more important determinant of investment. The incremental 
R2 of the stock market, once fundamentals are controlled for, is 2.2 
percent, compared to 3.8 percent in the whole sample. There is no 
evidence that the stock market is a more important predictor or deter- 
minant of investment for "small" firms. 
The fundamental and financing variables together explain 19.6 percent 
of the variation in investment. Interestingly, the coefficients on both the 
equity and debt financing dummies are larger than they are in the whole 
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sample, indicating the greater relative sensitivity of investment to 
external financing for "small" firms. Financing variables add 2 percent 
to the R2, adding relative stock returns adds another 2 percent. For 
"small" firms, as for the whole sample, the faulty informant, financing, 
and market pressure views of the stock market help explain the data, 
but not a lot. As in the whole sample, most of the explanatory power of 
financing comes from debt issues. 
A final test concerns the market pressure view of the stock market 
and investment. It has been argued that recently the stock market has 
become a harsher judge of managerial performance, with the takeover 
wave of the 1980s being a manifestation of its new role. The short 
horizons of corporate managers reflect these stock market pressures. If 
these views are correct, the sensitivity of investment to stock returns 
should have increased in the 1980s, and the coefficient on alpha in later 
years should be higher. We have tested this proposition and found no 
evidence to support this idea. There is no trend in the coefficient on 
alpha or in its marginal explanatory power over our sample period. 
Financing Equations 
We have established that there is a potential link from financing to 
investment and from the stock market to investment holding financing 
constant. We now look more closely at how responsive financing is to 
abnormal stock returns. The analysis provides more detail on the link 
between the stock market and investment, and sheds light on how much 
investor sentiment may affect financing itself. 
To address these issues, we estimate logit models in which the 
dependent variables are the three-year financing dummy variables from 
the previous section. The stock financing dummy is equal to 1 if the firm 
increased its shares outstanding by over 10 percent. The debt financing 
dummy is equal to 1 if the firm increased its debt by over 20 percent. In 
the logits, we control for the growth of sales and cash flow, just as in the 
investment equations. Our measure of return for each firm is alpha over 
a three-year period, starting two years before the three-year issuing 
period. For financing equations, this return measure provides the best 
fit. The results of the logits are presented in table 4. 
The results indicate that the probability of both debt and equity 
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Table 4. Financing Decisions of Firms over Three Years: Implied Probabilities 
of Issuing Debt or Equity, Given Selected Abnormal Stock Returns 
Value (and percentile) of alpha 
0.02 0.47 1.16 1.84 
(50th) (75th) (90th) (95th) 
Implied probability 
of issuing 
Equity 0.172 0.186 0.207 0.230 
Debt 0.365 0.376 0.393 0.411 
Logit equations for 
calculating probabilities 
Cash Number 
flow Sales in 
Equation Issue Constant Alpha growth growth sample 
4.1 Equity -1.670 0.200 0.060 0.840 7,774 
(7.0) (1.9) (12.3) 
4.2 Debt - 0.733 0.107 -0.227 1.860 7,971 
(3.8) (7.6) (22.2) 
Source: Authors' own calculations using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data bases. See table I for description of 
variables. The numbers in parentheses (bottom panel) are t-statistics. Given percentiles of alpha are chosen for 
illustration; other variables are evaluated at their medians in equations 4.1 and 4.2. 
financing rises with fundamentals growth and abnormal market returns. 
Using equation 4.1, at the median three-year alpha of 1.7 percent, we 
find that the implied probability of an equity issue is 17.2 percent. That 
probability rises to 20.7 percent at the 90th percentile alpha of 116 
percent, and to 23.0 percent at the 95th percentile alpha of 184 percent. 
We interpret these data to mean that the probability of an equity issue is 
moderately, but not strongly, responsive to the prior stock return. To 
get a 3.5 percent increase in the probability of an equity issue requires a 
1 6 percent extra abnormal return over three years. Financing is sensitive 
to prior stock returns, but just as with investment, the sensitivity is 
weak. The results for bond issues are similar. At the median alpha, the 
probability of an issue is 36.5 percent, which rises to 39.3 percent at the 
90th percentile and 41.1 percent at the 95th percentile. The stock market 
does not seem to have a strong effect on the frequency of either stock or 
bond financing. 
Though the frequency of external financing does not respond strongly 
to stock returns, perhaps the size of issues (average dollar proceeds) 
rises significantly when the firm's value rises. This effect may be 
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particularly important for equity issues because if the number of shares 
issued is held constant, dollar proceeds are proportional to the value of 
equity. We therefore turn to regressions in which we estimate the relation 
between abnormal stock returns and money raised through debt and 
equity financing. We normalize these proceeds by the firm's investment. 
This allows us to calibrate the potential growth in investment that would 
result if the entire amount of the higher proceeds from external financing 
were devoted to additional investment. In this way, we can reconcile 
our estimates of the effect of stock returns on investment with the effects 
that can be attributed directly to financing. 
Our analysis consists of separately regressing three-year proceeds 
from debt, equity, and both combined between t - 3 and t (normalized 
by the total amount of investment over the three years from t - 5 to 
t - 2) on abnormal returns from t - 5 to t - 2 (alpha) and sales and cash 
flow growth from t - 3 to t. These results are presented in table 5. As 
expected, stock returns have a much larger effect on proceeds from 
equity issues than on proceeds from debt issues. 
The parameter estimate for alpha says that a 100 percent abnormal 
increase in the share price is associated with an increase in average 
equity proceeds equal to 14 percent of the three years' investment. On 
the other hand, debt proceeds rise by only 5 percent of the three years' 
investment. The effect on combined proceeds is 19 percent of three 
years' investment. This implies that, assuming all additional proceeds 
from external financing are used for investment, a 100 percent abnormal 
return produces a 19 percent rise in investment over three years. The 
effect on investment would be smaller if the firm used the proceeds to 
pay higher dividends to existing shareholders, make acquisitions, or 
accumulate liquid assets. If the high valuation and issuing opportunity 
is viewed as temporary, the firm may spread out the proceeds over more 
years and investment will rise by less. 
It is interesting to contrast the potential financing effect on investment 
based on these estimates with the parameter estimates for abnormal 
returns in the three-year investment equations. Recall from equation 2.3 
that, controlling for sales and cash flow growth, a 100 percent abnormal 
return is associated with a 33 percent rise in annual investment over 
three years. The upper bound on the financing effect estimated here is a 
19 percent increase in investment. Thus, the impact of the financing 
effect on investment appears to be smaller than our estimated upper 
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Table 5. Regressions of the Ratio of Financing to Investment on Selected Financial 
Variables, Three-Year Spans, 1960-1987 a
Independent variables 
Cash Number 
flow Sales in 
FinancinglInvestment Alpha growth growth sample R2 
5.3 Equity/Investment 0.142 0.023 0.369 7,495 0.153 
(15.4) (2.4) (18.8) 
5.4 Debt/Investment 0.052 -0.071 0.867 7,630 0.148 
(4.0) (5.3) (29.1) 
5.5 (Debt + Equity)/Investment 0.189 -0.044 1.140 7,442 0.233 
(12.1) (2.8) (32.7) 
Source: Authors' own calculations using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data bases. Regressions include time-period 
effects. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
a. The ratio is between the dollar proceeds from debt and equity issues made between time t and t - 3 and the 
sum of investments made between time t - 5 and t - 2. Alpha is from t - 5 to t - 2 and sales and cash flow 
growth are from t - 3 to t. 
bound for the explanatory power of stock returns in the investment 
equations. At the same time, financing can plausibly account for a 
significant part of the explanatory power of stock returns in the invest- 
ment equations. The residual component could be due to market pressure 
or faulty informant effects or to the ability of stock returns to explain 
fundamentals that are not captured by our simple sales and cash flow 
measures. 
Taken together, the investment and the financing evidence do not 
leave much room for the influence of investor sentiment. External 
financing is not sufficiently sensitive to stock returns, and investment is 
not well explained by external financing. It is hard to explain much of 
the variation in investment through investor sentiment. 
Aggregate Investment Equations 
The results using firm-level data do not give relative stock returns 
much of a role beyond forecasting fundamentals. One possible reason 
for this result is that fads and fashions in the stock market are largely 
marketwide. Therefore, we would expect the financing and market 
pressure hypotheses to matter in the aggregate but not at the industry or 
firm level. This possibility is not self-evident; one could well imagine 
that financing would be particularly responsive to alphas rather than 
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marketwide returns. That is, if equity finance responds to extreme 
overpricing of equities, we should see a large effect from the alphas. On 
the other hand, theories of fads, such as those of Shiller and De Long 
and others, suggest that investor sentiment is likely to be more pro- 
nounced in the aggregate data.33 The issue is largely empirical. We 
therefore test the influence of the stock market on investment in aggregate 
data. 
The appendix describes the data we use on investment, fundamentals, 
and financing. The fundamentals that most clearly parallel the ones used 
in the firm-level data are cash flow (after-tax corporate profits plus capital 
consumption) and personal consumption expenditure. Personal con- 
sumption expenditure on durables, nondurables, and services seems to 
be the appropriate measure of final sales in the economy, which is our 
proxy for the growth of demand. Our investment variable is fixed non- 
residential investment, which excludes inventory investment. We use 
annual data on most variables from 1935-88, excluding the war period 
1942-46 as suggested by Robert Gordon.34 We exclude the early 1930s 
because corporate profits were negative in some of these years. Our 
equity finance variable is aggregated over all equity issues by all firms in 
the data developed by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
The debt finance variable is from the Federal Reserve. Unfortunately, 
this variable starts in 1952; therefore, we rerun some of the regressions 
starting in 1952 to utilize debt financing data. An interest rate variable, 
the lagged change in yield on AAA corporate bonds, was also tried in 
the list of fundamentals, but came in with the wrong sign and borderline 
significance. The variable was dropped. As before, all regressions are 
estimated in changes rather than levels. 
Unlike the firm-level data, we have found that two lags of stock 
returns as well as contemporaneous and lagged changes in fundamentals 
help explain investment growth in the aggregate data. Accordingly, we 
have adjusted the aggregate specifications to have one- and two-year 
lagged stock returns, as well as contemporaneous and lagged growth of 
consumption and cash flow. In addition, we allow for contemporaneous 
and one-year lagged effects from the financing variables. Typically, only 
the one-year lag is significant for the equity issues variable, while for the 
33. Shiller (1984); De Long and others (1990). 
34. Gordon (1986). 
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debt issues variable only the contemporaneous component is significant. 
Table 6 presents the results for the whole sample. 
In the aggregate regression, the one- and two-year stock returns 
together explain 33 percent of the variation in investment. Both are 
statistically significant, with the coefficient on the one-year lagged return 
significantly higher. Fundamentals together explain a substantial 81.3 
percent of the growth rate of investment. The fact that consumption 
growth is so strongly correlated with investment growth is not surpris- 
ing-it comes out of any Keynesian multiplier model. Nonetheless, we 
stress that the correlation in growth rates is by no means perfect, and a 
significant amount of variation remains to be explained, possibly by 
stock returns. 
If investor sentiment affects the stock market and thus investment, 
but not consumption, then we should expect the stock market to influence 
investment even after controlling for consumption. On the other hand, 
if the stock market works as a sunspot, coordinating agents' decisions, 
this role would not be captured after controlling for consumption. We 
test investor sentiment and not sunspot models. Our estimates should 
not be interpreted as structural parameters; we are simply describing 
quasi-reduced-form relationships between investment, financing, and 
fundamental variables. 
Equation 6.3 shows that the explanatory power of the stock market, 
after we control for the fundamentals, is only 1.8 percent. Also, the 
coefficients on lagged returns are no longer significant. The market 
accounts for only 10 percent of the residual variation in investment, 
which is much smaller than the 33 percent of variation that the market 
explains by itself. The stock market appears to be more significant than 
in the firm-level equations, but is not very important after controlling for 
fundamentals. The coefficient on the stock market does not seem large 
either. A 10 percent rise in the lagged market return leads to a O.8 percent 
increase in investment growth, which is not very large. The inclusion of 
the stock issues variable does not materially affect our conclusion; it is 
insignificant and does not have much explanatory power of its own. 
Given so small a role for the stock market, it is hard to see how the effect 
of investor sentiment through financing, market pressure, or false signals 
can be large. 
The two alternative models of the stock market's impact on investment 
are the passive and active informant views. James Stock and Mark 
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Watson demonstrate that, as a leading indicator of output, the stock 
market is dominated by a combination of other fundamental variables, 
including interest rates.35 This finding means that managers do not need 
the stock market to make investment decisions when they have other 
fundamental data; if most explanatory power comes from fundamentals, 
and managers do not need the stock market to predict them, then 
managers do not need the stock market to make investment decisions. 
This argument favors the passive informant view of the stock market. 
An important exception is the sunspot version of the active informant 
view. If the stock market informs investors and managers about which 
equilibrium is at work, the market determines both future consumption 
and investment. In this case, the stock market still plays an active role, 
even though it does not help predict investment growth after controlling 
for consumption growth. Our data do not enable us to distinguish the 
sunspot active informant model from the passive informant model. 
The results in table 6 suggest that the role of the stock market, beyond 
its ability to predict fundamentals, is limited. Nonetheless, we try to 
evaluate how well financing explains investment. As noted above, our 
equity financing variable does not explain much. As for debt finance, we 
must look at the post-1952 sample. Table 7 reports the results for the 
post-1952 period. For this period, the R2 for stock returns alone is 31.0 
percent, that for fundamentals alone is 67.4 percent. The incremental R2 
for the market, after controlling for fundamentals, is a much higher 7.3 
percent, which may mean more room for investor sentiment to influence 
investment. 
Equation 7.4 shows that when the equity issues variable is included 
in an equation with the fundamentals, it adds 2.6 percent to the R2 and is 
positive and nearly significant. When 10 percent more firms issue equity 
in excess of 5 percent, investment grows on average 1.5 percent faster. 
The debt issue variable alone adds 3.8 percent to the R2 and is negative 
and statistically significant. Debt financing is high when investment is 
slowing down. Debt seems to be used to smooth investment so that in a 
recession, when cash flow falls sharply, investment does not fall as 
sharply. The sign on debt finance is different from that in firm-level data, 
which can be explained if debt is used to smooth cyclical variation in 
investment but not idiosyncratic variation in investment. Together, the 
stock issue and debt financing variables have an incremental R2 of 9.5 
35. Stock and Watson (1990). 
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percent, which is much higher than in firm-level data. When the stock 
market is added to the equation with both fundamentals and financing 
variables, its incremental R2 is 3.4 percent and the coefficients are 
borderline significant. Thus, the stock market net of financing matters 
little. 
The incremental R2 from the stock market when financing variables 
are excluded is 7.3 percent; it is only 3.4 percent when financing variables 
are included. The stock market and financing variables, especially debt 
financing, are explaining the same variance, consistent with the financing 
view of the stock market. The trouble is that the coefficient on the debt 
financing variable is negative, so that it is not possible to tell the story 
that increases in stock prices make debt financing cheaper, more debt is 
issued, and investment rises. The equity version of the financing view 
receives a little more support from the data, but its role seems limited. 
When the equity financing variable is included, the incremental explan- 
atory power of the stock market is still 6.4 percent, which is not much 
below 7.3 percent, the incremental explanatory power of the stock 
market over and above fundamentals alone. Finally, the fairly low 
incremental R2 from stock prices when financing variables are included 
shows that the market pressure view and faulty informant view of the 
stock market are not particularly important either. 
As one final test of the potential impact of investor sentiment on 
investment, we included a measure of the change in the discount on 
closed-end funds.36 The coefficients on this variable, which we lagged 
like the stock market, were not significant when the stock market was 
included in the regression. This means that either discounts on closed- 
end funds are a poor measure of sentiment or, in keeping with the rest 
of our findings, investor sentiment does not affect investment. 
In summary, the stock market appears to have greater incremental 
explanatory power, after controlling for fundamentals, in aggregate 
equations than in firm-level equations, though its independent role is 
still quite limited. Before the financing variables are added, the market 
has an incremental R2 of over 7.0 percent over the post-1952 subperiod, 
although it is only 1.8 percent over the full period. This is respectable 
given that fundamental variables alone explain around 70 percent of the 
variation in investment. Once financing variables are added, however, 
36. Some research indicates that discounts are a plausible measure of investor 
sentiment. See appendix for full description of this variable. 
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the incremental explanatory power of the market falls to about 3 percent 
in the post-1952 sample. This result does not support the financing view 
of the stock market, since the coefficient on the debt finance variable, 
while significant, is of the wrong sign. The results imply a fairly small 
residual role for the stock market beyond its ability to predict fundamen- 
tals. The two hypotheses that best fit the data are the.passive informant 
hypothesis and the sunspot version of the active informant hypothesis. 
Aggregate Financing Equations 
In this section, we briefly present some financing equations using the 
aggregate data. Since the channel from the stock market to financing and 
from financing to investment did not appear to be important, these results 
will tell us little more about financing and investment. However, the 
results may shed light on financing decisions and their relationship to 
stock returns. 
Table 8 presents three sets of results: for stock financing over the 
whole period, for stock financing starting in 1952, and for debt financing. 
From CRSP, our stock financing variable is the proportion of firms that 
expand their outstanding shares (other than splits and stock dividends) 
by 5 percent or more. We construct our own aggregate series directly 
from the firm-level data. For the debt variable, we use debt issues by 
nonfinancial corporations as a fraction of their outstanding liabilities, a 
series that is available from the Federal Reserve. 
The financing equations show that stock returns are borderline 
significant in predicting stock financing, and not at all significant in 
predicting debt financing. In the full sample, a 10 percent higher stock 
return leads to a 0.3 percent increase in the fraction of firms that issue 
equity. The R2 in the equation with stock returns alone is minuscule, but 
the incremental R2 from the stock market, once fundamentals are 
controlled for, is 2.9 percent for stock financing in the whole sample, 1.3 
percent for stock financing since 1952, and 1.9 percent for bond financing 
with a negative coefficient. The results are consistent with a weak stock 
market effect on equity financing, although it is hard to believe that the 
investor sentiment component of that return has a big effect on invest- 
ment once all is said and done. 
Debt financing responds negatively to the growth of after-tax profits, 
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indicating that debt is used to smooth cash flows. Debt financing is also 
negatively correlated with lagged stock returns, and positively, but not 
significantly, with consumption growth. These results are consistent 
with our conjectures. During recessions, which follow low stock returns 
and exhibit low cash flow growth, companies issue debt to obtain cash. 
By doing so, they attenuate the declines in investment that would be 
even greater without debt finance. This story implies that debt finance is 
negatively correlated with investment growth in the aggregate data, even 
though debt finance actually keeps investment from falling even more. 
These results also support our earlier conjecture that the financing view 
of the stock market does not hold where debt is concerned-the need 
for funds determines when companies will issue debt, not the level of 
stock returns. 
The preceding analysis pertains to the financing practices of compa- 
nies already made public. It suggests that the stock market does not 
significantly influence the investment of these companies through fi- 
nancing, and that the market does not have a large impact on financing 
itself. This does not mean, however, that the stock market is a complete 
sideshow. It is important to remember that the stock market can be a 
key source of financing for new companies. Although we do not have 
the data to analyze new companies' investment, we do have data on the 
annual number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the United States 
between 1960 and 1987, and can examine whether IPOs respond to stock 
returns and closed-end fund discounts. 
The results are presented in table 9. Because the regressions are partly 
specified in levels, we test for linear and exponential trends and detrend 
accordingly. In the end, we regress the annual number of IPOs, which 
has been linearly detrended, on the CRSP value-weighted real stock 
market index, which has been exponentially detrended; on the value- 
weighted discount on closed-end funds (which does not have a significant 
trend); on the two-year growth of real personal consumption; and on the 
two-year growth of real after-tax corporate profits. 
Equation 9.1 shows that both the market index and the value-weighted 
discount significantly explain the pace of IPOs, and together they explain 
44 percent of the time series variation in the number of IPOs. This is a 
better fit than for any other financing or investment equation from stock 
market variables. The coefficient on the market index shows that as it 
rises from a median value of 134 to its 90th percentile value of 179, the 
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Table 9. Regression of the Detrended Number of Initial Public Offerings on Detrended 
Aggregate Financial Variables, 1960-87 
Growth 
Discount Growth in in 
Stock on closed- personal corporate 
Equation Constant indexa end funds" consumptionc profitsc R2 
9.1 -299 3.96 - 10.30 ... ... 0.441 
(2.61) (1.95) 
9.2 - 150 ... ... 4,617 -796 0.300 
(2.55) (3.18) 
9.3 -311 3.79 -8.10 363 - 222 0.462 
(1.88) (1.37) (0.15) (0.70) 
Source: Authors' own calculations using U.S. Department of Commerce data and the CRSP data base. The sample 
includes 28 observations. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
a. Stock index is the exponentially detrended level of the real CRSP value-weighted stock market index. 
b. The level of discount on closed-end funds is the year-end average discount on a portfolio of closed-end funds, 
from Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) for 1965-85, using a portfolio of 18 funds. For 1930-64 and 1986-89, five funds 
are used: Adams Express, General American, Lehman, Niagara Shares, and Tricontinental. 
c. Corporate profits and consumption are described in table 6. Here, as in table 8, we use two-year growth in 
profits and consumption as the independent variable. 
number of annual IPOs rises by 178, which is equivalent to rising from 
the median to roughly the 80th percentile of the number of IPOs. In 
contrast, when the closed-end fund discount rises from its 50th percentile 
value of 11.1 percent to its 90th percentile value of 17.8 percent, the 
number of IPOs falls by about 70. On this metric, the pace of IPOs is 
about 2.5 times more responsive to the value-weighted index than it is 
to the discount variable, but the fact that both are significant suggests 
that investor sentiment, as proxied by the closed-end fund discount, 
affects IPOs. 
Equation 9.2 shows that the fundamental variables together have an 
R2 of 30 percent, which is smaller than that of the stock market variables. 
Equation 9.3 shows that, after controlling for fundamentals, the value- 
weighted index remains significant and its coefficient loses little of its 
value. The coefficient on the closed-end fund discount does not change 
much either, but becomes much less significant. The incremental R2 
from the two market value variables is 16 percent, which is higher than 
we have seen elsewhere. In sum, the stock market itself and the closed- 
end fund discount, as a measure of sentiment, appear to influence initial 
public offerings both on an absolute scale and relative to their influence 
on equity and debt financing of seasoned firms. In the IPO market, 
investor sentiment may very well be important. Unfortunately, the 
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strength of our conclusions is limited by the short time series we have 
on IPOs. 
Conclusions 
This paper was motivated by the concern, present in both public 
policy discussions and in the economics literature, that the stock 
market's deviant behavior has real consequences for the economy. Is 
the stock market a sideshow, or does it instead direct investment, 
perhaps erratically? We have tried to evaluate empirically whether the 
stock market has a large, independent influence on investment using 
both firm-level and aggregate data. 
The firm-level regressions show that movements in relative share 
prices are associated with fairly large and statistically significant invest- 
ment changes when fundamentals are held constant, but the incremental 
R2 from relative stock returns is fairly small. The cross-sectional varia- 
bility of investment is sufficiently large that relative stock returns can 
account for only a small part of it. We have argued that the explanatory 
power of relative stock returns for investment is unlikely to be evidence 
that the stock market provides new information to managers, since 
managers probably learn little from the market about their own firms' 
idiosyncratic prospects. We have also provided evidence that the relation 
between relative stock returns and investment is not driven by the costs 
of external financing. The explanatory power of relative stock returns 
for investment may be evidence of the market exerting pressure on 
managers, although it also seems likely that the market is picking up the 
effect of imperfectly measured fundamentals. By simply including the 
contemporaneous growth rate in cash flow and sales we are able to 
reduce the explanatory power of relative stock returns from 13 percent 
to 4 percent. In any event, the 4 percent incremental R2 from the return 
is small relative to what we expected. It suggests that even if the market 
does exert pressure on managers (or even inform them), it is not a 
dominant force in explaining why some firms invest and others do not. 
In some respects, the firm-level evidence is much more important for 
policy discussions than the aggregate evidence. The allocation of capital 
across firms and sectors strikes us as more important than the timing of 
business cycles and the allocation of investment over time. The fact 
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that, in the firmi-level data, the stock market has small explanatory power 
for investment, beyond its ability to predict fundamentals, suggests that 
complaints about the misallocation of resources due to the stock market 
may be exaggerated. For if managers respond strongly to the market's 
whims about their firms and that is a pervasive problem, we would 
expect these whims to explain a larger part of the variation in investment. 
The market may not be a complete sideshow, but nor is it very central. 
The aggregate evidence speaks to the issue of allocation of capital 
over time. High stock prices can lead to high investment through low 
financing costs, and by signaling good economic times, thus encouraging 
managers to invest. Such encouragement can be misleading, as when 
sentiment leads corporate managers astray, or can be self-fulfilling, as 
when the market acts as a sunspot. 
Our aggregate evidence rejects the importance of the financing effect 
of stock prices for seasoned firms. There is no evidence that high returns 
lead to significantly more equity or debt financing; in fact, debt financing 
is low following high stock returns. We have also found substantial 
evidence against the view that the stock market acts as a faulty informant 
about future activity. Controlling for fundamental and financing varia- 
bles, the incremental R2 from stock returns is 2 to 3 percent, and the 
coefficients are borderline significant. Incidentally, the fundamental 
variables that make the stock market redundant as a predictor go only 
as far as one year ahead. The notion that the stock market evaluates 
long-term prospects of the economy, and so guides long-term invest- 
ment, is not supported by the data. 
Two views of the stock market are consistent with the aggregate data. 
The first is the passive informant view, which says that the stock market 
simply captures information that people already know, and does not 
direct investment. The second view is that the stock market is the key 
sunspot, coordinating the investment decisions of corporate managers, 
which are then justified by the resulting boom or recession. Importantly, 
there is nothing irrational about the stock market in this case, it just 
determines which of the possible multiple equilibria is at work. The first 
view seems more appealing for several reasons. First, there is the Stock 
and Watson finding that the stock market gets knocked out as a predictor 
of the short-run future course of the economy once other predictors are 
included in regressions. One could argue that the stock market is the 
first sunspot and everything else follows, but this may be stretching it a 
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bit. Second, in episodes such as the late 1920s and post-October 1987 
corporate managers have largely ignored this sunspot. Overall, a fair 
reading of the evidence is that the stock market is a sometimes faulty 
predictor of the future, which does not receive much attention and does 
not influence aggregate investment. 
An important exception to this finding is the evidence from the initial 
public offerings data, where both the stock market index and the discount 
on closed-end funds help predict the pace of new offerings. This evidence, 
though limited by the lack of data, suggests that in the market for new 
issues, the stock market and investor sentiment matter. It could still be 
that market conditions affect only the timing of IPOs, and not their 
volume over time. On the other hand, it could be that in low markets 
good ideas die because they cannot be financed. The effect of investor 
sentiment on the new issues market is an important area for further 
research. 
APPENDIX 
Description of Data 
IN THE APPENDIX we describe the sources of our data and the methods 
used to calculate our variables. 
Firm-Level Data 
Investment: "Capital expenditures" are from annual statement of changes 
in financial position, from COMPUSTAT data base, 1959-87, including 
COMPUSTAT Research File; acquisitions are not included; observa- 
tions with growth rates above 1,000 percent are excluded as outliers for 
this and all the other variables. 
Sales: From COMPUSTAT, 1959-87. 
Cash flow: Net income plus depreciation, from COMPUSTAT, 1959- 
87. 
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Net debt issues: ABook debt, divided by book debt, I, from COMPUS- 
TAT, 1959-87. 
New share issues: Sale of common equity divided by the beginning-of- 
year total market value of common equity, from COMPUSTAT, 1971- 
87; where above was missing, including between 1959 and 1970, sale of 
common equity is estimated from change in the number of shares 
outstanding reported in CRSP, filtering out changes due to liquidation, 
rights offering, stock splits, or stock dividends. 
Alpha: CAPM betas were estimated for each firm using all available 
monthly returns. These betas were then used to calculate an alpha for 
each year. Data are from CRSP, 1959-87. 
Aggregate Data 
Investment: From U.S. Department of Commerce, "Gross Private Fixed 
Investment, Non-residential"; the series is the sum of investment in 
nonresidential structures and equipment for 1935-41 and 1947-88. 
Consumption: Aggregate personal consumption (including nondurables, 
durables, and services) from the U.S. Department of Commerce, 1934- 
41 and 1947-88. 
Cash flow: After-tax total corporate profits (without depreciation sub- 
tracted) from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1934-41 and 1947-88. 
New debt issues: The ratio of net funds raised from corporate bonds to 
total outstanding liabilities, obtained from sector statements of savings 
and investment for nonfinancial corporate business; from Federal Re- 
serve, 1952-89. 
New share issues: Individual firm share issues were calculated using 
CRSP data as described above. Aggregate variable is the fraction of 
firms increasing the number of shares by more than 5 percent in a given 
year. 
Stock return: Value-weighted index return from CRSP, 1933-41 and 
1947-88. 
Closed-end fund discount: Year-end average discount on a portfolio of 
closed-end funds; from Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler for 1965-85, using a 
portfolio of 18 funds; for 1930-64 a portfolio of five funds is used (Adams 
Express, General American, Lehman, Niagara Shares, and Tricontinen- 
tal); the same five funds also used for 1986-89. 
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Inflation: Most firm-level and aggregate variables are deflated using the 
GNP deflator. One exception is aggregate investment, which is deflated 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce's implicit price deflator up to 1982 
and by the "chain investment index," suggested by Gordon for 1983- 
88. Also, aggregate personal consumption is deflated by implicit price 
deflator for personal consumption expenditures. 
Comments 
and Discussion 
Matthew Shapiro: The stock market and investment are positively 
correlated. This well-known empirical finding provides the point of 
departure for the authors' theoretical discussion. In it, they provide an 
interesting and useful classification scheme for explanations of this 
correlation. For the most part, they put aside the question of whether or 
not the stock market is efficient in the sense that it appropriately discounts 
future cash flows. Instead they ask a more interesting question. Namely, 
do the fundamentals, specifically the accumulation of fixed capital, 
respond to movements in the stock market? Of course, the extent to 
which investment responds to the stock market depends on the efficiency 
of the stock market. The authors' theoretical section clearly addresses 
this simultaneity. 
Most economists think of the relationship between the stock market 
and investment in terms of q, the ratio of market value to replacement 
cost. John Maynard Keynes viewed stock market fluctuations as largely 
irrational and hence not useful signals about the profitability of invest- 
ment projects. In William Brainard and James Tobin's formalization of 
Keynes's chapter 12, managers react to potentially irrational movements 
in the market by financing expansion either through new issues, when q 
exceeds one, or through mergers and acquisitions, when q is less than 
one.' Andrew Abel's and Fumio Hayashi's derivations of q-theoretic 
models of investment implicitly assume rational stock market valuation 
to the extent that the shadow value of the fixity of capital is associated 
with financial variables.2 Under certain assumptions, their q-theoretic 
models are observationally equivalent to Brainard and Tobin's. But in 
1. Brainard and Tobin (1968). 
2. Abel (1979); Hayashi (1982). 
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these derivations, q diverges from one only because adjustment costs 
keep the actual capital stock from equaling its desired level. The stock 
market appropriately reflects this out-of-steady-state outcome.3 
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny do not use q to 
discuss the relationship between the stock market and investment. 
Nonetheless, their lucid theoretical discussion clarifies how the stock 
market's decision to rationally discount future cash flow affects the 
correlation. The authors consider four hypotheses. One of their hypoth- 
esis, which is closely related to the Keynes-Brainard-Tobin q-model, is 
that the market is irrational, but managers use its swings to finance 
investment. In another hypothesis, the managers of firms actually learn 
about the profitability of their investments from the stock market. In a 
third, the managers have superior information about their profits, so 
they do not learn from the market, but the econometrician gets a signal 
about profitability from the stock market. These latter two hypotheses 
maintain that the stock market is rational; both hypotheses are related 
to adjustment-cost based implementations of the q-theoretic models, but 
the signaling hypothesis is closest to Abel's and Hayashi's models. 
Finally, the authors consider a fourth hypothesis-that the investment- 
stock market correlation arises because managers try to increase re- 
ported profits by curtailing investment when their stock price falls. 
Most of the authors' evidence bears on the first and third hypotheses. 
They have no sharp tests of the fourth hypothesis. They dismiss the 
second hypothesis-that managers learn about the profitability of their 
investments from the stock market-because they believe that managers 
have superior information about the profitability of their investments 
and describe evidence based on managers' stock trading that supports 
this belief. The authors' arguments about managers' superior knowledge 
of their firms' cash flows are convincing. Yet, even if managers have 
superior knowledge of the profitability of their projects, the market may 
still provide information useful to them in making investment decisions. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny discuss stock returns as if they were 
governed only by innovations in current and expected future cash flows. 
But stock returns also move with changes in the rates by which cash 
3. Tobin and White (1981) note that Summers's (1981) estimates of a q-theoretic 
equation imply incredibly high adjustment costs. Although they make this point as a 
reductio ad absurdum of models that link the stock market and investment only through 
adjustment costs, many have taken this finding as impetus for formulating more compli- 
cated, but still adjustment-cost driven, q-models. 
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flows are capitalized. Capitalization rates may change because of either 
changes in the economywide required rate of return or changes in the 
risk discount for the individual firm. Managers of firms may well change 
the rate at which they discount future cash flows based on movements 
on their firms' values. The decomposition of stock returns into innova- 
tions in required rate of return and cash flow bears on their empirical 
work. 
The authors' basic regression relates investment growth to stock 
returns. Their discussion of the specification proceeds totally innocent 
of previous work on the demand for capital. There is little mention of 
the q-theory in their paper despite its obvious relevancy. Indeed, the 
equation that they estimate is roughly equivalent to differencing the q- 
theoretic investment equation. In the q-theoretic specification, the left- 
hand-side variable is the investment-capital ratio. In the authors' speci- 
fication, it is the percentage change in investment. Hence, they approx- 
imately difference the numerator of the q-theory's investment-capital 
variable while letting the change in the capital stock (the denominator) 
be subsumed into the error term of their regression. Similarly, the right- 
hand-side variable of the q-theoretic equation is average q, the ratio of 
market value to replacement cost. Variation in the numerator of average 
q is dominated by revaluation of equities, so differencing average q 
yields a variable related to stock returns. In their empirical work, the 
authors quantify stock returns as the lagged idiosyncratic movement in 
the sum of price change and dividend yield. Thus, their equation differs 
somewhat from differencing the q-theoretic equation: it does not account 
for replacement cost or the revaluation of nonstock financial claims; it 
looks at just the idiosyncratic movements in stocks where the q-theory 
would equally include the aggregate component; and the return is lagged 
rather than contemporaneous. 
Despite these differences with the q-theoretic specification, the au- 
thors' empirical results echo the more familiar ones. First, in both their 
results and those obtained from q equations, the stock market gets a 
small coefficient. Second, one of the empirical shortcomings of estimated 
q-investment equations is the extreme serial correlation of their resid- 
uals. The authors' differenced equations can be understood as acknowl- 
edgments of this empirical problem with the q equation. Third, in both 
sets of equations, variables such as cash flow and sales come in much 
more strongly than the stock market. 
Putting aside whether or not the authors' results should be understood 
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in terms of the q-theory, one should note that examining the growth of 
investment is a perilous way to study the demand for capital. Lawrence 
Summers, in his "Requiem for the Investment Equation," points out 
that having the level of investment as the left-hand-side variable does 
not make sense unless the right-hand side controls for the deviation of 
the current capital stock from the desired level (as does the q-theory).4 
Firms demand a stock of capital; investment is merely the regulation of 
that stock. Most investment equations sin by slipping a derivative. The 
authors slip two derivatives by examining the growth in investment. 
Consequently, the authors' choice of specification makes it very difficult 
to interpret the magnitude of their estimated coefficient and makes it 
hard to believe that these coefficients do not vary across firms depending 
on how actual capital stock departs from its desired level. 
The authors claim that there is too much firm-level heterogeneity for 
them to model the relationship in levels. Their inability to get sensible 
results in a levels specification arises because they have omitted key 
factors, such as the stock of capital, from their analysis. Unless the 
omitted factors are deterministic trends, differencing does not solve the 
specification problem. 
The authors run the reverse regression with the financing variables 
on the left-hand side to see how they are correlated with stock returns. 
One can see from the first set of regressions (with investment growth on 
the left-hand side) that stock returns and the financing variables cannot 
be highly correlated. Including the financing factors does not greatly 
affect the estimated sign of the stock return variable. Therefore, the 
authors could make their point without recourse to the second set of 
regressions. 
The authors present results at both the firm and the aggregate level. 
Their main equation has investment growth as the dependent variable 
and includes lagged stock returns, other variables (cash flow and sales) 
to capture the fundamental determinants of stock returns, and still others 
(dummies for large new issues of equity and debt) to capture new 
financing. In the firm-level regression, the stock return is purged of its 
correlation with the aggregate return. In these estimates, the stock 
market is highly significant and has a large coefficient compared to the 
aggregate estimates. When the fundamentals variables are included in 
4. Summers (1985). 
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the regression, they are also very significant and have important explan- 
atory power. Their inclusion makes the coefficient on the stock return 
fall somewhat, but it is still large compared to the aggregate estimates. 
Hence, the fundamental factors are important in explaining investment, 
but leave a significant role for the stock return. The financing factors are 
also significant in the regression. Their inclusion leads only to a further 
small reduction in the coefficient of the stock returns variable, so the 
stock returns and financing factors are essentially independent. 
While the absence of the theoretical model makes these results hard 
to interpret, it is possible to draw some conclusions. The finding that the 
stock return is a significant explanatory factor for investment, but is 
hardly a sufficient statistic, is consistent with the large body of empirical 
work on q-theoretic investment models. 
The significance of the sales and cash flow variables is hard to interpret. 
Steven Fazzari, Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce Peterson include them in 
similar equations, but those authors include them to show that liquidity 
affects investment. On the other hand, the present authors interpret 
these variables as the fundamental determinants of stock values. Absent 
more information, both the Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson and the 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny explanations of the correlation of invest- 
ment and cash flow are consistent with the data.5 
The significance of the coefficients of the new equity and new debt 
dummy variables does not imply that financing causes investment. 
Suppose that the world is Modigliani-Miller on the margin, that is, that 
firms choose a capital structure that equates the marginal cost of funds 
across different types of financial claims. New investment must be 
financed by some means. On the margin, a firm should desire to use all 
means; thus, it is not surprising to see investment correlated with both 
forms of financing. Therefore, the financing-investment correlation is 
not evidence against the economic independence of real decisions from 
financing decisions. 
The authors abstract from aggregate movements in the stock market 
in their firm-level regressions by only including the idiosyncratic com- 
ponent of stock returns and also by including year dummies in the 
regressions. While neglect of these aggregate components does not bias 
their estimates, it does reduce the power of their procedure. There is no 
5. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988). 
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theoretical justification for abstracting from the aggregate component of 
stock returns. By omitting this component, the authors reduce the 
potential role of their returns variable. Moreover, it would be interesting 
to see how the aggregate component enters the regressions. They could 
either report the annual dummies or, better, exclude them in favor of 
including the systematic component of stock returns (the beta times the 
aggregate return). As noted earlier, managers should respond to changes 
in the required rate of return, about which the aggregate market return 
carries an important signal.6 Consequently, by abstracting from the 
aggregate, the authors potentially understate the role of the stock market 
for investment. Doing so also makes it difficult to compare the aggregate 
and firm-level results. 
In the aggregate regressions, the stock market has roughly the same 
coefficient as the firm-level regressions when the univariate relationship 
is considered, but falls dramatically when the fundamentals are included. 
The text of the paper reads as if the stock market explains more in the 
aggregate regressions than the firm-level regressions. The authors come 
to this conclusion because they rely inappropriately on theR2. Comparing 
R2's across samples is misleading because the error variances are so 
different at the firm and aggregate levels. Indeed, as judged by the size 
and significance of the coefficient of the stock returns variable, the 
relationship between investment and the stock market is much larger in 
the firm-level regressions. 
James M. Poterba: Stock market anomalies-the January effect, the 
weekend effect, the alphabet effect-are a favorite topic of conversation 
at Brookings Panel meetings. If asked to justify these anomalies as 
legitimate subjects of macroeconomic interest, most economists would 
argue that the stock market provides vital signals for investment and 
consumption decisions. An understanding of its movements is therefore 
important to an understanding of macroeconomic fluctuations. 
In this provocative paper, Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny attempt to end these discussions. They argue that the conven- 
tional view of the stock market as an important determinant of corporate 
6. They should also respond to firm-specific hanges in required rates of return caused 
for example by changes in the risk-structure of their returns. These could be captured by 
changes in the betas. Since the authors assume them to be constant, these changes are 
included in the estimated alphas. 
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investment is misplaced. Drawing on a rich base of firm-level investment 
data and stock return data, the authors argue that to a first approximation, 
swings in the stock market are irrelevant forfirm investment decisions. 
The findings are significant not only because they illuminate what 
determines investment, but also because they carry strong implications 
for the welfare cost of "noise trading" and other forces that cause 
transitory divergences between asset prices and fundamental values. 
This paper suggests that even if prices gyrate inappropriately, they may 
have little effect on real activity. 
The findings in this paper may come as a surprise to some subscribers 
to the q-theory of investment, which links stock price and investment. 
Even without this paper, however, a skeptic would have found grounds 
for concern regarding the stock market's predictive power. James Stock 
and Mark Watson's recent work on leading indicators finds that in 
predicting real output the stock market is dominated by a collection of 
other variables. A twenty-year BPEA tradition of running horseraces 
between competing investment equations has shown that q-models are 
outpaced by equations including cash flow, output, and other flow 
measures of corporate activity. ' 
The central contributions of the current paper are the use of firm-level 
data in studying the forecast power of the stock market and the focus on 
the incremental explanatory power of the stock market. Although the 
basic conclusions seem relatively robust, both the choice of data and the 
statistical analysis in this paper invite scrutiny. 
First, the timing convention in the regression equation excludes 
current stock returns, but includes current cash flow or sales. Since the 
fundamentals are all dated later than the stock market variable, they 
have an informational advantage. This concern applies both to the firm- 
level and aggregate estimates. However, results provided to me by the 
authors suggest that this issue is not of critical importance: inclusion of 
the current stock return rather than the lagged stock return in the firm- 
level equations actually reduces explanatory power; in the aggregate 
equation, the current stock return enters with a negative coefficient. 
Thus, the timing convention is unlikely to be central to the empirical 
conclusion. 
1. Sensenbrenner (1990) suggests that q- and neoclassicial accelerator models can 
perform similarly if a sufficiently rich lag structure is considered. 
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A second issue of specification concerns the use of time effects in the 
analysis of individual firm investment. Their use removes the effect of 
aggregate stock market movements, even though these may be an 
important source of the market's explanatory power for each firm. One 
can easily imagine that managers invest more (given their firm's cash 
flow) when the stock market overall is high, signaling future good times. 
Even if the broad market movements were uninformative for investment 
of a given firm, the results would be far stronger than the current findings. 
A third difficulty is that the paper does not perform the appropriate 
test of how stock returns affect investment. The ideal test would examine 
the stock market's explanatory power at t - 1 after controlling for 
expectations of future fundamentals that were formed by information at 
t - 1. This would argue for development of a firm-level or aggregate 
model to predict dividends. Then, the change in the optimal forecast of 
the present discounted value of dividends should be compared with the 
stock return in forecasting future investment. 
A final concern is that the findings are sensitive to changes in 
specification and sample period. Two other studies-those by Robert 
Barro and Olivier Blanchard, Changyong Rhee, and Lawrence Sum- 
mers-that the authors cite estimate similar models with aggregate 
investment data.2 Barro reports stronger evidence on the link between 
stock returns and investment than this paper finds. The difference 
between his results and those of the current paper is apparently due to 
his inclusion of lagged investment, and his somewhat longer sample 
period. Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers's paper uses a more formal 
methodology to construct the expected present value of dividends and 
to contrast the predictive power of this series with the predictive power 
of actual stock prices. Using this approach, they were not able to draw 
strong conclusions about the real effects of sentiment-induced swings in 
share prices. Thus, I remain nervous that the current findings, particu- 
larly in aggregate data, are not definitive. 
Turning from data to statistical methods, I believe this paper also 
alters the focus of prior debate. By concentrating on the stock market's 
incremental explanatory power for investment spending, the authors 
shift from the traditional analysis of q-investment spending. It is impor- 
tant to distinguish, as the authors do, the claim that the stock market is 
2. Barro (1990); Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1990). 
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not incrementally important from the claim that it is not important in 
explaining investment. Unless two variables are orthogonal, there is no 
way to decompose the share of the variance in another series that they 
explain. This is not a critical issue with respect to the firm-level data- 
where the stock return alone can explain roughly 5 percent of the 
investment variance compared to an "incremental" explanation of 2 
percent. The issue is more important, however, with respect to the time 
series findings (see table 6). In this case, the R2 of the stock market alone 
is 0.33, while that of corporate profits and personal consumption is 0.81. 
The incremental R2 of the stock market is only 0.02, but this may be a 
misleading guide to the stock market's power. 
The finding of low total explanatory power for the stock market does 
not necessarily imply that sentiment-driven shifts in stock prices do not 
have significant real effects. There could easily be two sources of 
variation in stock prices-one fundamental, one fad. If managers could 
distinguish the two, and respond more to one than the other, the reduced- 
form relation between stock returns and investment could be very weak, 
even if fad-induced price movements had very large positive, or negative, 
effects on investment. 
Despite these concerns, the empirical results in this paper are striking 
for the ease with which other specifications reduce the stock market's 
explanatory role in investment. Knowing only the firm's cash flow and 
sales, one could predict future investment nearly as well without the 
stock price as with it. Should one believe the findings? They are consistent 
with anecdotal evidence on firm behavior during recent years. In January 
1988, a Conference Board survey asked top executives if the stock 
market crash had affected their investment plans. More than three- 
quarters said no. They are also consistent with "episode analysis" 
performed by Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers, who report that in 1986 
and 1987 the rapid increase in U.S. equity values was not matched by 
higher levels of investment. The other natural experiment, provided by 
the 1929 stock market crash, disagrees with the current findings. Invest- 
ment did not rise in the late 1920s by as much as the market would have 
predicted, but it declined precipitously in 1930-31, just as the market 
signals would have suggested. 
The final question this paper raises is whether the presence of noise 
traders or other sources of nonfundamental variation in stock prices 
affects investment. While the paper's general theme is that such effects 
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are small, there are other channels which may be important. An example 
illustrates this. If noise traders raise the general level of required returns 
in the equity market, these traders will reduce the level of investment in 
all periods, without regard to particular stock market movements. 
Exploring these channels is a natural direction for future work. 
General Discussion 
Several panelists questioned the authors' view that the R2 of the 
regression of investment on stock prices was an upper bound to the 
distortionary impact that noise in stock prices might have on investment. 
Christopher Sims observed that some shocks, unlike changes in expected 
future earnings or discount rates, can push stock prices and investment 
in the opposite direction. Without controlling for such shocks, the R2 
would underestimate the response of investment to noise. Sims gave, as 
an example, a reduction in the price of capital goods, which would lower 
stock prices for firms with existing capital stocks but would increase the 
amount of investment. William Brainard noted that any of the several 
reasons that have been given for why marginal q, which provides the 
incentive for investment, may move in the opposite direction from 
average q, are reasons why the R2 of these equations could underestimate 
the potential damage from noise. One frequently cited example is the 
run-up of energy prices after OPEC, which reduced quasi-rents on 
existing energy-intensive capital goods, but stimulated investment in 
new, more efficient capital. 
Robert Barro noted that to the extent that changes in investment had 
a multiplier-type effect on consumption, consumption could appear to 
explain investment, even if animal spirits were in fact the primary driving 
force. Benjamin Friedman pointed out that large changes in stock prices 
are often accompanied by large changes in other variables. For example, 
after the crash of 1987 interest rates fell and the dollar depreciated; both 
worked to increase the attractiveness of investment. These phenomena 
argued for the inclusion of interest rates and other variables in the 
aggregate equations. Robert Gordon replied that the absence of an 
investment response to the stock market crash was less surprising when 
one remembered that at the end of 1987 the market was at the same level 
as at the end of 1986. The fact that firms did not revise investment down 
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because of the crash may reflect the fact that they had not revised it up 
in response to the stock price boom in the first half of 1987. 
Some panelists were concerned that the authors had not paid enough 
attention to the possible intertemporal relationships among the variables 
and therefore may have underestimated the potential influence of market 
noise and given too much weight to fundamentals. Sims suggested that 
a positive signal could lead to an increase in sales contemporaneous 
with, or even leading, investment. To examine this issue, he suggested 
running vector autoregressions and looking at the proportion of variance 
at various horizons explained by stock market innovations. 
Lawrence Klein suggested testing for robustness, possibly by com- 
paring estimates for different sample periods. Since the noise component 
was so large in the cross-sectional estimates, he conjectured that small 
changes in specification could lead to large changes in coefficient 
estimates. Gordon pointed out that the 1950s saw two big booms in the 
stock market with sluggish investment and wondered if the results would 
be robust to splits of the sample into pre- and post-1952 periods. 
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